

1 **Abstract**

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3 This speech was delivered at the meeting of the International Society for
4 Ecological Economics at Reykjavik, Iceland on 13th August 2014 at the
5 presentation of the 2014 Kenneth E. Boulding Memorial Award. In the speech
6 Peter Victor pays tribute to Kenneth Boulding, one of the pioneers of ecological
7 economics, and then describes his own principal contributions to ecological
8 economics over a period of 45 years. These contributions include environmental
9 applications of input-output analysis, the problematic extension of the concept of
10 capital to nature, the definition and analysis of green growth, and his research on
11 ecological macroeconomics and the challenge to economic growth.

12

13 **Keywords**

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15 Boulding, spaceship earth, input-output analysis, materials balance, throughput,
16 environment, greenhouse gas emissions, sustainable development, natural
17 capital, green growth, system dynamics, LowGrow, ecological macroeconomics.

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25 **1. Introduction**

26 I am deeply honoured to receive the Boulding Award for 2014 and I thank the
27 Boulding Award selection committee of the ISEE for recognizing my work in this
28 way. And I am especially pleased to be receiving the award in Iceland, a peaceful
29 country of great beauty.

30

31 In 1967, when I first read Boulding's brilliant essay on the Economics of the
32 Coming Spaceship Earth (Boulding, 1966), I realized that it was well ahead of its
33 time. Sad to say, it still is for most economists, present company excepted. As a
34 graduate student at UBC I was very fortunate to hear Boulding speak. Although I
35 can't recall the details of his presentation, I do remember leaving the seminar
36 with aching sides, never having laughed so much, before or since, at an
37 academic meeting, or at any meeting come to think of it. Kenneth Boulding was a
38 very funny man with an impish sense of humour. You may not agree with
39 everything he said, but you sure had fun hearing him say it.

40

41 Although Boulding did not describe himself as an ecological economist, he did
42 contribute to its foundations. And he exemplified the importance for ecological
43 economists of having a wide and deep knowledge of economics as well as a
44 solid appreciation of numerous other disciplines and their interconnections. This
45 is why ecological economics is hard but it can also be fun, and no one
46 appreciated that more than Boulding. I have spent my entire career as an
47 academic, public servant, private consultant and development advisor, working
48 on the ecological economics agenda that Boulding set out all those years ago,

49 and I have had plenty of fun along the way. So this award given in Boulding's
50 name is especially meaningful to me.

51

52 Boulding's metaphor of the 'spaceman economy', in the language of the day, was
53 inspired by the race in the 1960s between the USA and USSR to land a man on
54 the moon. The space race gave rise to famous photographs of the Earth that,
55 over the years, have changed our perception of ourselves and of our place in the
56 universe. Speaking in particular of economics, Boulding argued that "the closed
57 earth of the future requires economic principles which are somewhat different
58 from those of the open past." (ibid 1966, p.9) In his inspirational essay, he gave
59 important clues about the required changes in economic principles he foresaw.
60 What I want to do in my remarks today is to remind ourselves of his key insights
61 from 50 years ago, and then consider some areas in which we have progressed
62 since his day as we build an ecological economics fit for the twenty-first century.

63

64 So what is the foundation that Boulding gave us half a century ago? In describing
65 the economy and its relation to the environment, Boulding distinguished between
66 open and closed systems in relation to matter, energy, and information. He
67 explained that economies are subsystems of the biosphere and considered the
68 significance of the second law of thermodynamics for energy, matter, and
69 information. This was five years before Georgescu-Roegen published his
70 celebrated treatise on *The Law of Entropy and the Economic Process* (1971).

71

72 Boulding observed that fossil fuels are a short-term, exhaustible supplement to
73 solar energy, and that fission energy does not change this picture. He considered
74 the prospects for much better use of solar energy enhanced perhaps by the
75 biological revolution. He challenged the conventional wisdom on consumption
76 and its contribution to well-being by suggesting that human welfare should be
77 regarded as both a stock and a flow. He asked, for instance, whether it is “eating
78 that is a good thing, or is it being well fed?” (ibid p. 8)

79

80 Boulding wondered what the present generation owes to posterity and why we
81 should care about the future, noting the historical evidence which suggests “that
82 a society which loses its identity with posterity and which loses its positive image
83 of the future loses also its capacity to deal with present problems, and soon falls
84 apart.” (ibid p.11) And he observed our natural propensity to discount the future
85 and that perhaps “conservationist policies almost have to be sold under some
86 other excuse which seems more urgent.” (ibid p.12)

87

88 Boulding thought the law of torts was quite inadequate to correct the price
89 system where “damages are widespread and their incidence on any particular
90 person is small”. (ibid p.14) Corrective taxation, he said, might play a useful role,
91 especially in addressing more immediate problems of environmental
92 deterioration, but he also recognized that human impacts on the environment
93 have spread from the local to the global. He commented that technological
94 change has become distorted through planned obsolescence, competitive
95 advertising, poor quality, and a lack of durability.

96

97 Boulding famously summed up his analysis by comparing what he termed a
98 “cowboy” economy, which is designed to maximize throughput (for which gross
99 domestic product (GDP) is a rough measure), with a “spaceman” economy in
100 which stocks are maintained with minimum throughput. He said all this and more
101 in 11 short pages. If there is a better and more succinct account of the principles
102 of ecological economics than the one he gave in 1966 I haven’t seen it.

103

104 I will now turn to aspects of ecological economics in which considerable progress
105 has been made since Boulding’s time. I’ll focus on four in which my own work
106 has played a part:

107

- 108 • The extension of input-output models to include materials throughput.
- 109 • Sustainable development and the widening definition of capital.
- 110 • Utilization of conventional economic tools to examine green growth.
- 111 • Managing without growth.

112

113 **2. Input-Output Analysis and the Environment**

114 In the late 1960s a few economists began to realize that input-output analysis,
115 described by Leontief in the 1930s, could be applied to environmental problems.
116 Leontief himself published a paper in 1970 in which he introduced a pollution
117 abatement sector that purchases goods and services from other sectors and
118 sells the service of pollution abatement. He showed how the model could be
119 used to estimate the price impacts of pollution abatement expenditures.

120 (Leontief, 1970). However, he did not incorporate the principle of materials
121 balance in his model, though in 1969 Ayres and Kneese had shown how this
122 could be done theoretically within the Walrasian multi-market model. (Ayres and
123 Kneese, 1969). According to the materials balance principle, materials are
124 neither created nor destroyed in an economic process, only their form is
125 changed.

126

127 Working independently as a doctoral student at the University of British Columbia
128 in the late 1960s, I realized that the concept of externalities was grossly
129 inadequate to capture the comprehensive links between economies and the
130 environment. Externalities is a microeconomic concept, one that is not up to the
131 task of addressing the macroeconomic problem of scale. I became preoccupied
132 with the materials balance principle: the idea that all materials (including fossil
133 fuels) obtained by an economy from the environment, eventually become waste
134 products. I began to conceive of economies as embedded in the environment
135 and dependent upon it, and I wondered about applying the materials balance
136 principle to an entire economy. Figure 1 shows one of my earliest sketches of an
137 integrated economy-environment system as I struggled to conceptualize the key
138 relationships. There is an economic system in which various stocks (R, K, F and
139 A) are interconnected through material flows. There are also material flows
140 linking each stock to the encircling environment comprised of land (L), air (E) and
141 water (W).

142

143

INPUT OUTPUT	R	K	F	A	LEW
R	$(1-\gamma-\beta)U_R$	$R^K + \beta U_R$	$R^F + \gamma U_R$	0	N^R
K	$K^K + \alpha U_K$	$K^K + (1-\alpha)U_K$	$K^F + \alpha U_K$	0	N^K
F	$b U^F$	$a U^F$	$(1-a-b)U^F$	$C^F + C^D$	N^F
A	$L^R + U^A$	L^K	L^F	0	N^A
LEW	M^R	M^K	M^F	M^A	0


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153 **Fig. 2 Early input-output table based on the materials balance principle - 1969**

154

155 At the time I drew this table I did not know much about input-output analysis, but
 156 by good fortune Professor Gideon Rosenbluth had already agreed to supervise
 157 my dissertation and he happened to be an expert in this methodology. It took me
 158 less than a minute to explain to him my dissertation proposal: to apply the
 159 materials balance principle to the Canadian input-output model, theoretically and
 160 empirically. He approved and I was on my way. Relying solely on information
 161 sources in the UBC library I completed the dissertation in less than a year and in
 162 1972 it was published as a book: *Pollution: Economy and Environment* (Victor,
 163 1972). I take some pride in the fact that the book is still referred to in publications
 164 on environmental extensions of input-output analysis and that the methodology I

165 developed has been taken up and adapted by academics, researchers, public
166 servants and commercially successful companies such as TruCost in the UK.
167
168 Figure 3 is a recent example (developed with Brett Dolter and Tim Jackson) of
169 how input-output analysis can be used to examine the relationship between
170 greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and employment at the sector level. It shows
171 the direct and indirect emissions and employment for \$1m spent on final demand
172 in each of 12 sectors. The estimates come from a highly aggregated version of
173 Canada's input-output model using data for 2010. They illustrate how a suitably
174 modified input-output model can provide detailed, consistent, comprehensive,
175 quantitative measures of key economic and environmental variables and
176 relationships, in this case the direct and indirect GHG emissions and employment
177 arising from \$1million of final demand for the output of each sector. The Figure
178 shows substantial variation among the sectors suggesting the possibility of
179 changing the composition of GDP and simultaneously reducing GHG emissions
180 and increasing employment.
181




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183 **Fig. 3 Canadian employment v GHG emissions 2010 per \$m of final demand**

184

185 The methodology of applying input-output analysis to quantify economy-
 186 environment interactions has advanced in the past 40+ years as have the
 187 available databases. In particular, there are now global, multi-regional input-
 188 output tables that include a range of material flows and which are in the public
 189 domain. One such database is the World Input-Output Database (Timmer, 2012).
 190 Working with my doctoral student Brett Dolter, we used this database to compare
 191 the GHG emissions embedded in the consumption of numerous countries
 192 regardless of where the consumed goods and services are produced (their GHG
 193 'shadows'), with their domestic emission of greenhouse gases. (Dolter and
 194 Victor, 2014).

195



196

197 **Fig. 4 Percentage of GHG 'Shadows' to Domestic GHGs** Dolter and Victor,
 198 (2014)

199

200 Figure 4 shows that throughout 1995-2009 the GHG shadows of Sweden,
 201 Germany and the USA exceeded the release of GHGs within their territorial
 202 borders, and especially in the case of Sweden, by a very considerable amount.

203 Meanwhile, Canada saw its GHG shadow rise over this period and in 2006

204 Canada's GHG shadow surpassed its domestic emissions of GHGs.

205

206 The trends in this graph are due to changes in trading patterns and different
 207 production technologies in the trading countries. As a major exporter of

208 manufactured goods, China's GHG shadow is less than its domestic GHG

209 emissions, though since 2006 the gap has begun to close. When the WIOD

210 database is fully updated it will be possible to see whether the most recent trends
211 in comparative GHG emissions have continued.

212

213 **3. Sustainable Development and Capital**

214 The term ‘sustainable development’ was popularized by the UN’s Commission on
215 Environment and Development in its widely read report, *Our Common Future*
216 (1987). The concept of sustainability has a long history in forestry, for example,
217 where the principles of sustainable forestry were developed over centuries. In the
218 1980s and early 1990s the idea of ‘living off the interest’ was discussed in the
219 environmental community, and having studied the economics of resource
220 management at UBC years before, this was a concept with which I was quite
221 familiar. But interest stems from capital and in the 1990s the emphasis switched
222 from living off interest to maintaining and enhancing capital. Sustainable
223 development increasingly came to be understood in terms of the transmission of
224 undiminished stocks of capital from one generation to the next. Human capital
225 had been around in economics since the 1960s (e.g. Becker, 1964) and of
226 course, financial and manufactured or built capital were very familiar concepts in
227 economics and business. The new understanding of capital that took off in the
228 1990s began with ‘natural’ capital and was soon followed by social capital,
229 cultural capital and other types of capital thought by their proponents to be
230 important.

231

232 In 1991 I published a paper entitled “Indicators of Sustainable Development:
233 Some Lessons from Capital Theory”, (Victor, 1991). I was motivated by an

234 awareness that importing the concept of capital into the environment and
235 development discussion was being done with little regard to the complexities of
236 the concept of capital which had occupied some of the best and most prominent
237 economists for more than a century. In particular, the famous 'capital
238 controversy', which involved a prolonged debate between economists at
239 Cambridge, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts, had drawn attention to the
240 theoretical and practical problems of measuring capital in the aggregate,
241 difficulties that would only be magnified by extending the concept of capital to
242 nature.

243

244 My concern about thinking of nature as capital is that the essence of capital is the
245 capacity of human action to change it in various ways: to increase it through
246 investment, to make it more productive through technological change, and to
247 substitute it for other inputs in the economy. To apply the same assumptions to
248 nature is quite a stretch and even goes against the intentions of those who
249 promote the idea of natural capital in the belief that it provides a rationale for its
250 preservation. Capital is made from nature, not vice versa, and it depreciates if not
251 maintained by humans, whereas nature flourishes if left alone. If natural capital
252 can be made more productive through technology, say through GMOs, and if
253 scarce, can be substituted by manufactured capital, as with theme parks and
254 synthetic grass, then why bother to preserve it at all? It is because nature is not
255 well conceived as capital that it's worth protecting.

256

257 Above all, conceptualizing nature as capital invites us to adopt an exploitative
258 attitude towards nature. Manufactured capital has value *only* because of the
259 goods and services it provides to the human economy. Describing nature as
260 capital implies that nature has value for a similar reason: to provide goods and
261 services to humans. Nature as capital is an object not a subject, or collection of
262 subjects, with which humans co-exist. As such it denies, or minimizes, the ethical
263 value of nature itself, of individual and connected ecosystems, of non-human
264 species and their members. These are all just capital to be valued for their utility
265 to humans. And if nature as capital turns out to be worth less than the value
266 derived from its destruction, what then will proponents of natural capital say?

267

268 Attempting to solve this problem by claiming that natural capital is only part of a
269 larger framework in which cultural and spiritual values of nature are also
270 recognized risks a contradiction: how to integrate a view of nature based on one
271 view, that of nature as capital, which implies substitutability, with others that do
272 not. This is not just a methodological issue. It runs deeper, to how we conceive of
273 ourselves and how we conceive of the world in which we live, issues I believe
274 that are much in need of more work by ecological economists.¹

275

276 **4. From Sustainable Development to Green Growth**

277 The now famous definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland report

¹ For a powerful critique of natural capital along these lines and also stressing how the concept relates to power and vested interests, see Monbiot, 2014.

278 was one of several. On being awarded the Elizabeth Haub Prize for
279 Environmental Diplomacy in 2006, Jim MacNeill, secretary to the Commission
280 and responsible for writing much of its report, said that “I no longer shock easily
281 but to this day I remain stunned at what some governments in their legislation
282 and some industries in their policies claim to be ‘sustainable development.’ Only
283 in a Humpty Dumpty world of Orwellian doublespeak could the concept be read
284 in the way some would suggest.” (MacNeill, 2006). The lack of clarity in the
285 definition of sustainable development turned out to be more a weakness than a
286 strength. For example, it left wide open the question of whether economic growth
287 could be sustained indefinitely, so much so that the term sustainable growth
288 began to be used synonymously with sustainable development and in some
289 quarters, to displace it.

290

291 It’s no surprise, therefore, that the search soon began for new language to
292 supplant sustainable development. One term that has emerged in the past few
293 years is ‘green growth’, promoted strongly by various international organizations
294 and national agencies. Again the issue of definition has arisen. The OECD
295 defines green growth as “fostering economic growth and development, while
296 ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental
297 services on which our well-being relies.” (OECD, 2011, p.4) Likewise the multi-
298 authored report, *Green Growth in Practice: Lessons from Country Experience*
299 (De Boer, Meier, Bickersteth, 2014) states “Green growth is becoming an
300 attractive opportunity for countries around the world to achieve poverty reduction,
301 environmental protection, resource efficiency and economic growth in an

302 integrated way. Green growth strategies generate policies and programs that
303 deliver these goals simultaneously.” (ibid p. 12)

304

305 Neither of these reports, and many others like them, provides a clear,
306 unambiguous definition of green growth. Instead they describe desirable
307 economic, environmental and social outcomes and place extraordinary emphasis
308 on gains in productivity and efficiency to achieve them. In contrast to much that
309 has been written about sustainable development in which economic growth has
310 been called into question, the green growth literature insists that we can have it
311 all. Indeed, UNEP tells us that: “a Green Economy grows faster than a brown
312 economy over time, while maintaining and restoring natural capital.” (UNEP,
313 2011, p. 500)²

314


315 So how should green growth be defined? The minimal requirement of an
316 acceptable definition should include something that grows and something that is
317 green. When UNEP says that a green economy grows faster than a brown one, it
318 is referring to the rate of growth of real GDP. Notwithstanding the well-known
319 critiques and limitations of GDP as a measure of economic success and well-
320 being, GDP remains the key metric for measuring economic growth so I will use it
321 here. Given the already excessive burden of economies on the biosphere, an
322 economy with an increasing GDP can only become genuinely greener if such
323 growth entails an *absolute* reduction in one or more measures of environmental

² For a critique of the model on which this result is based see Victor and Jackson, 2012

324 impact. For instance, a reduction in domestic GHG emissions per unit of GDP
325 (i.e. GHG intensity) without an absolute reduction in total GHG emissions does
326 not warrant the designation 'green'. And if reductions in domestic emissions of
327 GHGs are achieved through changes in trade thereby shifting the emissions
328 abroad, then the growth is still not green.

329

330 By this logic, *green growth can be defined as economic growth that is slower*
331 *than the rate of reduction in one or more intensities* since only then will
332 environmental impact decline absolutely. Of course, green growth may not be
333 green enough if the decline in environmental impact falls short of reduction
334 targets, but at least it represents movement in the right direction. Likewise, brown
335 growth occurs when the rate of economic growth exceeds the rate of reduction in
336 intensities, and black growth when both scale and intensities increase. As Figure
337 5 shows, the 'colours of growth framework applied to domestic GHGs can be
338 applied to degrowth (in GDP terms) as well.




339

340 **Fig. 5 The Colours of Growth (Victor, 2010, p.241)**

341

342 Figure 5 provides a scale/intensity framework for assessing the extent to which
 343 green growth has been realized in the past and its prospects for the future. In
 344 1990 Canada's GDP was \$825,318m (2002\$) with a GHG intensity of 0.72 kg
 345 GHG/\$m (fig. 10). Any combination of scale and intensity on the red line would
 346 generate the same 591mt of GHGs. Starting from the particular combination of
 347 scale and intensity in 1990 we can describe the particular trajectory of Canada to
 348 2011 as in Figure 6, where the combination of GDP and GHG intensity in each
 349 year is shown by a single dot. For Canada it was a period of brown growth: even
 350 though Canada's GHG intensity declined, the reductions were overwhelmed by
 351 even faster increases in scale.




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354 **Fig. 6. The Scale and Intensity of Canada's Economic Growth 1990-2011**

355

356 Starting from the scale, intensity and emissions for 2011, Figure 7 shows what
 357 will be required in extent and rate of 'decarbonization' to meet a reduction of 87%
 358 in Canadian GHG emissions in 50 years, through various combinations of
 359 changes in scale and intensity. In particular, it shows that the faster the economy
 360 grows, the faster GHG intensity *must* decline to meet this target, or any reduction
 361 target for that matter. Proponents of green growth seem to think that higher rates
 362 of intensity reduction are associated with, even result in, faster rates of economic
 363 growth although the historical evidence for such a relationship is sparse. (Victor,

364 2008, pp. 120-122)³This is something we need to know more about. In the
 365 meantime, we do know that a greater absolute reduction in environmental impact
 366 will be achieved from reductions in intensity the slower is the rate of economic
 367 growth.
 368



369
 370 **Fig. 7. Scale and Intensity: Achieving an 87% reduction in Canada's GHG**
 371 **emissions from 2011 level in 50 years**

372

373 4. Managing without Growth

374 The discussion of green growth entailed an analysis of change over time of three
 375 variables: scale, intensity and outcome with two degrees of freedom. It did not

³ See Smil (2014) for a detailed account of the history of materials and energy decoupling and an assessment of future possibilities. He is not optimistic about the prospects for absolute decoupling.

376 consider causal or feedback relationships among the variables and gave no
377 insight into the system that the metrics were describing. For that we need
378 something more powerful, such as system dynamics.

379

380 Donella Meadows, one of the authors of *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al,
381 1972) wrote that she had “been lucky enough to run across four Great Learnings
382 in my life, the third of which was dynamic modeling.” (Hannon and Ruth, 1994,
383 p.v) At about the same time that Boulding was using systems concepts to write
384 about spaceship earth, Jay Forrester of MIT was developing the theory of system
385 dynamics and *Dynamo*, a programming language for building system dynamics
386 models on mainframe computers. Subsequently, several software packages
387 were designed for using system dynamics on personal computers, providing
388 researchers with a powerful tool for thinking about systems.

389

390 There are several features of system dynamics that make it extraordinarily useful
391 in ecological economics. System metrics are flexible and a variety of metrics,
392 monetary and non-monetary, can be included in the same model. This is very
393 convenient when economic and ecological variables are being considered
394 together. Any system that can be represented as a set of interdependent stocks
395 and flows, with linear and non-linear relationships and feedback loops can be
396 represented with ease in system dynamics.


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398 System dynamics models can also be very data rich. One example is *LowGrow*,
399 the macroeconomic model I started developing about 10 years ago to investigate

400 whether and under what conditions it would be possible, in the absence of
 401 economic growth, to have full employment, no poverty, fiscal balance, and
 402 substantial reduction in GHG emissions, This inquiry was triggered by a phone
 403 call from Gideon Rosenbluth, then in his eighties, asking me to work with him on
 404 the question of growth. We published papers together in the early 2000s, (Victor
 405 and Rosenbluth, 2004) which became the foundation for my book *Managing*
 406 *without Growth: Slower by Design, not Disaster* (2008).

407

408 The high level structure of LowGrow is shown in Figure 8.



409

410 **Fig 8. High Level Structure of LowGrow (Victor, 2008)**

411

412 In LowGrow, aggregate (macro) demand and the Cobb-Douglas production

413 function jointly determine the employment of labour and the utilization rate of the


414 capital stock.⁴ Since investment increases the capital stock, increases in
415 aggregate demand are required to avoid increasing unemployment. This is also
416 the case if the labour force increases and/or if capital and labour become more
417 productive over time, other things equal. But other things need not be equal. For
418 example, a decline in the average workweek can mitigate the impact of these
419 pressures on unemployment, a carbon price can induce reductions in
420 greenhouse gas emissions and more generous antipoverty measures can reduce
421 poverty.

422

423 LowGrow proved to be very useful for examining possible alternative economic
424 futures in an advanced economy (Canada). Three scenarios are shown in shown
425 in Figures 9, 10 and 11.


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⁴ All aggregate production functions are problematic as summary representations of production in entire economies. The Cobb-Douglas function is no exception. In LowGrow, energy requirements and GHG emissions associated with production (key components of throughput) are estimated with coefficients that are variables in the system and subject to change. The forestry sector is also linked to the production function via GDP.



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
428 **Fig. 9 Business as Usual in the Canadian Economy (Victor, 2008)**



429

430 **Fig. 10 A No-Growth disaster in the Canadian Economy (Victor, 2008)**

431



432

433 **Fig. 11 A Low/No Growth Scenario of the Canadian Economy (Victor, 2008)**

434

435 Figure 9 shows a business as usual scenario for Canada, assuming that the
 436 trends in key variables for the 25 years preceding 2005 were to continue. GDP
 437 per capita would double, government debt to GDP ratio would decline (all levels
 438 of government combined), GHG emissions would increase nearly 80% and
 439 unemployment would rise then decline, ending up 20% higher in 2035 than in
 440 2005. Significantly, after three more decades of steady growth, poverty, as
 441 measured by the UN's Human Poverty Index, which is a composite of variables
 442 for income, life expectancy and literacy, would rise. The percentage of poor
 443 Canadians would remain about the same but because of population growth,
 444 there would be more poor Canadians in 2035 than in 2005. With such negative
 445 implications for GHG emissions, unemployment and poverty, this BAU scenario
 446 is not very appealing.

447

448 The second scenario shown in Figure 10 is based on a set of changes such that
449 growth in GDP per capita is extinguished. This is simulated in LowGrow by
450 removing growth from all of the variables in LowGrow that generate economic
451 growth: consumption, investment, government expenditure, a positive trade
452 balance, growth in population and the labour force, and productivity. The
453 changes to these variables are phased in over 10 years starting in 2010 so that
454 by 2030, when they have worked their way through the system, GDP per capita
455 ceases to grow. As Figure 10 suggests, this would be a formula for disaster with
456 unemployment, poverty and the debt to GDP ratio becoming tragically high and
457 GHG emissions remaining about the 2005 level.

458

459 Figure 11 presents a more attractive low/no growth scenario, one in which GDP
460 per capita is stabilized well above the level in 2005, while unemployment,
461 poverty, the debt to GDP ratio and GHG emissions are substantially reduced.
462 This scenario comes about as a result of a combination of initiatives including a
463 reduced work year, expanded anti-poverty programs, a revenue neutral carbon
464 tax, stable population and labour force, reduced net investment and balanced
465 trade. Additional, complementary changes in policies, values and institutions
466 would be required to realize a scenario of this sort and although a number of
467 authors, myself included, have written about what would be required, there is
468 much more to be done to prepare the way. (See for example, Jackson, 2009,
469 Speth ,2012)

470

471 Of course, proposals for initiatives such as these are not new. What is new, and
472 what makes system dynamics and other similar modeling approaches attractive,
473 is the ability to examine how the initiatives might interact with each other, to
474 estimate quantitatively the nature of these interactions for improved policy
475 design, and to understand more clearly the comprehensive nature of the changes
476 that are required to bring about positive change.

477


478 **5.1 Ecological Macroeconomics: GEMMA and FALSTAFF**

479

480 The experience of the financial crisis of 2008/09 taught many economists that it's
481 impossible to make sense of modern economies without placing finance, if not at
482 the center, then certainly in a prominent position in our analysis. LowGrow lacked
483 a financial sector. It also included only very limited elements of throughput, and
484 dealt in national aggregates and averages, limiting its usefulness for analyzing
485 issues at the sub-national level. In 2010, I teamed up with Tim Jackson of the
486 University of Surrey to build a new system dynamics model of national
487 economies encompassing the financial system, the real economy, and material,
488 energy, waste throughput. We drew upon our shared knowledge of system
489 dynamics, input-output analysis, mainstream and heterodox economics, national
490 and international economic and environmental databases and added newly
491 obtained understanding of the financial system and stock flow consistent models
492 relying heavily on modern money theory (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, Wray, 2012)
493 to set about constructing what we have come to call ecological macroeconomics.

494

495 Our overall conception of ecological macroeconomics is illustrated in Figure 12.
496 In the models we are developing, all financial assets are balanced by financial
497 liabilities and all financial flows are simultaneously expenditures and incomes. An
498 integrated set of accounts is maintained for five sectors: households, financial
499 corporations, non-financial corporations, government and the rest of the world.
500 These sectors are linked to the real economy represented by a 12 sector input-
501 output model which is connected to the biogeosphere through a wide range of
502 material flows.



503

504 **Fig. 12 A schematic of ecological macroeconomics**

505

506 Working with Tim has been a highlight of my rather long career in ecological
507 economics. We have published a few papers and reports together with more to
508 come in the near future. Time will tell if ecological macroeconomics will fulfill its

509 considerable promise. Its breadth and depth are daunting. But it is fun, and
510 Boulding would have approved of it for that reason alone.

511

512 **6. What next?**

513 Ecological economics has come a long way since 1966 when Boulding set out
514 his vision for an economics more consistent with our planetary boundaries,
515 (Rockstrom et al, 2009). More than anything, it is the context within which we
516 must do ecological economics that has changed. Environmental issues have
517 expanded from the local to the regional and global. In 1966 the global population
518 was 3.4 billion. Now nearly 7.2 billion of us, and rising, require food, clothing,
519 housing, and everything else essential for a good life. The world's economies are
520 bigger and more intertwined than ever. Increasingly powerful corporations have
521 out grown the capacity of national institutions to control them. We are starting to
522 become aware that we are in the Anthropocene, an era in which humanity has
523 become a geologically significant player through our impact on the biosphere. All
524 these changes demand a response from ecological economics.

525

526 A small part of that response is represented by the recently launched project,
527 Economics for the Anthropocene, in which colleagues at McGill University and
528 York University in Canada and the University of Vermont in the USA will train up
529 to 60 PhDs in ecological economics, with numerous partners from the public,
530 private and NGO sectors. Another promising sign is the proliferation of
531 organizations using ecological economics to inform public discourse and policy
532 such as the New Economics Foundation in the UK, the New Economics Coalition

533 and the Centre for Advancement of a Steady State Economy in the USA, and the
534 degrowth movement centred in Europe.

535

536 The time has come to make some big choices. Ecological economics has done
537 much to outline what these choices are, and provided some useful analytical
538 tools, but more is needed before society at large will be ready to face up to the
539 new realities. If we fail to rise to the occasion then I fear that the future looks very
540 bleak. But despite the limited progress that has been made since I began my
541 own personal journey in ecological economics, I remain hopeful that a brighter
542 future is still available and, as ecological economists, we have much to contribute
543 to its realization.

544

545 In closing, and in the spirit of Kenneth Boulding who enjoyed capturing the
546 essence of a conference at its conclusion in a short poem, I offer one of my own
547 as a tribute to him and to all of you working on ecological economics.

548

549 **Boulding's Vision**

550

551 When Boulding saw the Earth from Space, it gave him cause to question

552 The economics he'd been taught, so he made his own suggestion.

553 He said the day of cowboy thought, had had its time and more.

554 We need a spaceship economics, for the future that he saw.

555

556 We'd take a systems view of things, with science as our guide.

557 Make planet Earth our reference frame, the economy inside.

558 Use concepts, data, ethics, and thinking that is logical.

559 And build an economics that is truly ecological.

560

561

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