

# Income-based environmental responsibility

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## Abstract

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are an environmental pressure that currently arise serious concerns and that are subject to strong mitigation efforts. An allocation of the mitigation effort among multiple agents requires the prior allocation of emissions among those same agents by a metric of carbon responsibility. The metric adopted by current climate policy is production-based (or territorial) responsibility. However, other types of responsibility have been discussed in the literature, namely consumption-based (or upstream) responsibility and downstream responsibility. In this paper we study the latter type, which is little explored in the literature, with the aim of bringing downstream responsibility to the climate policy discussion. We clarify the term through a novel nomenclature, *income-based responsibility*, we present a case-study, with the quantification of income-based responsibility for 112 world regions, and compare the results with production and consumption-based responsibilities.

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## 1. Introduction

In the economic process primary factors of production, such as natural resources, labor and capital, are transformed into consumption goods and services, generating externalities measured by negative environmental pressures. There is a widespread perception that the current levels of consumption and the consequent exploitation of natural resources are unsustainable, leading to environmental problems, such as the alteration of current climate patterns, scarcity of drinking water or scarcity of arable land. In order to control and minimize the externalities that result from the economic process it is necessary to quantify environmental pressures and to allocate their responsibility to the economic agents involved.

Climate change is currently a priority area of environmental policy (UNEP, 2007; OECD, 2008; EEA, 2010), with a lot of attention focused on anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, changing climate patterns and their potentially dangerous consequences. Many scientists believe that in order to reduce these risks a substantial reduction of GHG emissions is needed (mitigation).

The attribution of responsibility for GHG emissions is challenging, due to several characteristics of the climate change problem: it is global in its causes and consequences and its effects will only be known in the long term, raising uncertainty and risk regarding any mitigation measure (Stern, 2007). The global nature of climate change requires global action; for example if

23 one big emitter does not commit to its responsibility and mitigation target,  
24 it is unlikely that the rest of the world can compensate for it. Moreover any  
25 emitter that stays out of any agreement will benefit from the action taken  
26 by others; mitigation efforts to cope with climate change can be considered  
27 public goods which allow for free-riding phenomena (Stern, 2007), poten-  
28 tially impairing or delay climate policy. The extent of global participation is  
29 essential because the higher the participation rate in any action taken, the  
30 least costly will be (OECD, 2003).

31 Since 1992, in the Earth Summit, international negotiations are in place  
32 seeking a global agreement for the attribution of GHG emissions' responsi-  
33 bility and reduction. But only in 1997 significant results were achieved, with  
34 the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol each country should report, through  
35 a national GHG inventory, the 'emissions and removals taking place within  
36 national (including administered) territories and offshore areas over which  
37 the country has jurisdiction'. For the countries who ratified it, a binding  
38 target of reduction of GHG emissions was also established: 5% (on average),  
39 during the 2008-2012 period against 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1998).

40 Under the Kyoto Protocol, a country should hold responsibility for all the  
41 emissions that are directly generated by the production processes that take  
42 place within its borders. This type of responsibility is often called *producer-*  
43 *based responsibility*, and accounts for the *direct emissions* of a country.

44 The geographic boundary established for GHG inventories, also used in  
45 other environmental statistics, leaves the emissions generated by interna-  
46 tional activities unaccounted for, and does not consider the transfer of emis-  
47 sions through international trade, enhancing the possibilities of carbon leak-

48 age (Pedersen and de Haan, 2006; Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Peters et al.,  
49 2011) This may mean that a large fraction of emissions is not accounted  
50 or is and therefore that the responsibility of each country is not correctly  
51 determined (de Haan, 2004; Pedersen and de Haan, 2006). Moreover, the  
52 geographic boundary system is not directly comparable with macroeconomic  
53 indicators, like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), defined in the System of Na-  
54 tional Accounts (SNA) (Pedersen and de Haan, 2006; Peters and Hertwich,  
55 2008b; UN, 2009), thus hindering the connection between environmental pres-  
56 sure and economic agent.

57 The limitations of this approach became evident when big emitters, like  
58 the USA and China, refused to ratify the Protocol or to commit to binding  
59 targets. Underlying these decisions were issues of fairness and fear of im-  
60 paired competitiveness among countries (Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Whal-  
61 ley and Walsh, 2009). Developing economies that are highly dependent on  
62 exports, like China and India, claim that they should not bear the responsi-  
63 bility for the production that they do not benefit in terms of consumption.  
64 On the other hand USA, and other developed economies, feared that their  
65 economy's competitiveness would be impaired if they had to cope with any  
66 binding target that would not also apply to developing economies. Envi-  
67 ronmental regulations can draw away investors, promoting the relocation of  
68 industries to environmental unregulated economies (pollution haven hypoth-  
69 esis) and enhancing any potential carbon leakage. These positions have not  
70 changed, as it could be seen in the COP15 meeting, held in Copenhagen in  
71 2009. The Copenhagen Accord, which was supposed to be the successor of  
72 the Kyoto Protocol, does not establish binding targets, although it recognizes

73 that a deep cut in emissions is necessary (UNFCCC, 2010).

74 An often suggested measure to reduce the effect of carbon leakage in a  
75 country's competitiveness are carbon-tax adjustments. This tool involves  
76 the participation of individual countries in a global scheme of emissions re-  
77 duction. Participating countries lay a charge on products imported from  
78 non-participating countries, which reflects the costs in terms of carbon as if  
79 they had been produced domestically; goods traded between participating  
80 countries would be exempt from any extra surcharge (Ismer and Neuhoff,  
81 2004; Whalley, 2009). This mechanism would allow participating countries  
82 to be partially refunded from their carbon abatement costs, whereas non-  
83 participating countries exporting to participating countries would face an  
84 extra charge (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004) and thus have an incentive to join  
85 the scheme. The effectiveness of carbon-tax adjustments as well as their  
86 compatibility with World Trade Organization are issues still under debate  
87 (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004; de Cendra, 2006; Whalley, 2009).

## 88 **2. Consumption-based responsibility**

89 Consumption-based responsibility has been discussed by several authors,  
90 as an alternative to direct emissions, to name a few: Eder and Narodoslawsky  
91 (1999); Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001); Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003); Bas-  
92 tianoni et al. (2004); Peters and Hertwich (2008a,b); Davis and Caldeira  
93 (2010). This metric measures all the emissions generated to produce a coun-  
94 try's final demand for goods and services. These equal the emissions gener-  
95 ated within national territory minus domestic emissions required to generate  
96 exports plus foreign emissions required to generate imports. For a certain

97 product, this metric takes into account all the emissions generated along its  
98 supply chain prior to the delivery to final demand; for that reason these are  
99 often called *upstream embodied emissions*.

100 The adoption of this type of responsibility is supported by China. Around  
101 20% of China's emissions are generated in the production of exports, therefore  
102 China claims that a fair agreement should take into consideration that those  
103 emissions take place to produce goods that are not consumed by the Chinese  
104 people (BBC, 2009).

105 The boundaries of consumption-based responsibility are comparable with  
106 the System of National Accounts (SNA) (de Haan, 2004; Pedersen and de Haan,  
107 2006), and in accordance with the System of Environmental-Economic Ac-  
108 counts (SEEA) (UN, 2003). Instead of using geographic boundaries, the  
109 perspective of consumption-based responsibility is based on the resident prin-  
110 ciple. According to this principle, a country is responsible for the emissions  
111 generated by the demand of its resident units. A resident unit is, according  
112 to UN (2009) 'a unit that has a center of predominant economic interest in  
113 the economic territory of that country', but might hold some economic in-  
114 terests abroad. This includes emissions embodied in imports but leaves out  
115 emissions embodied in exports. In fact, consumer-based responsibility is not  
116 more than a carbon trade balance as was pointed out by Rodrigues et al.  
117 (2010); Serrano and Dietzenbacher (2010).

118 Economic and environmental accounting evolved independently. The first  
119 is well established and widely used, whereas the second is often compiled by  
120 different entities and for different and specific purposes, therefore using a  
121 variety of concepts, methods or units. Having an environmental metric that

122 is congruent with the SNA is important, because it facilitates comparisons,  
123 analysis and comprehension by policy makers and homogenizes the accounts  
124 allowing also for analysis through time (UN, 2003; de Haan, 2004).

125 Unlike what happens with production-based inventories, consumption-  
126 based responsibility accounts for the emissions generated through interna-  
127 tional activities, and minimizes the effects of carbon leakage by holding coun-  
128 tries responsible for the emissions embodied in their trade balance (Peters  
129 and Hertwich, 2008b; Peters, 2008; Bruckner et al., 2009; Marques et al.,  
130 2011).

131 A measure of responsibility based on consumption is a trade related mea-  
132 sure, that in the context of climate policy can be seen as a carbon consump-  
133 tion tax without being a real tax and therefore not interfering with WTO  
134 regulations (Peters, 2008). On the other hand consumption-based GHG in-  
135 ventories can be used to measure the carbon content of goods and services  
136 and determine a tax on consumption, like Value Added Tax, that would  
137 reflect the costs of a certain product in terms of carbon.

### 138 **3. Income-based responsibility**

139 Some authors have analyzed another metric of environmental pressure,  
140 downstream responsibility (Rodrigues et al., 2006; Lenzen et al., 2007; Ro-  
141 driguez et al., 2010; Lenzen and Murray, 2010). This metric measures all  
142 the emissions required to generate a country's income through wages, profits  
143 and rents. These equal the emissions generated within national boundaries  
144 minus domestic emissions required to pay for imports plus foreign imports  
145 required to pay for exports. For a certain factor, this measure accounts for all

146 the emissions generated downstream in its supply chain until delivery to final  
147 demand; for that reason these are often called *downstream enabled emissions*.

148 Downstream responsibility has never received the same discussion as its  
149 consumption-based cognate, perhaps because there is not yet a clear notion  
150 of what it means (Lenzen and Murray, 2010). A recent work by Lenzen  
151 and Murray (2010) has provided a substantial clarification of the term, by  
152 providing a match between the less known downstream-based vocabulary and  
153 the well-know consumption-based vocabulary. There are applications of the  
154 concept at the level of countries (Rodrigues et al., 2010; Lenzen and Murray,  
155 2010; Marques et al., 2011), and at the corporate level (WBCSD and WRI,  
156 2010; Lenzen and Murray, 2010).

157 The boundaries of downstream responsibility are also comparable with  
158 the SNA (de Haan, 2004; Pedersen and de Haan, 2006). The total emissions  
159 enabled by the primary supply of a country are equal to the total of emissions  
160 enabled by the various classes of primary inputs: households (mainly as  
161 receiver of wages as payments for labour), by the government (mainly as a  
162 tax collector and provider of public goods) and by capital owners (as receiver  
163 of profits). The income-based emissions of a country include the emissions  
164 enabled by the supply to the international market (exports) but does not  
165 include the emissions enabled by the demand from the international market  
166 (imports) (Rodrigues et al., 2010; Marques et al., 2011).

167 From a technical point of view, the accounting of income-based respon-  
168 sibility has the same characteristics as consumption-based responsibility.  
169 Therefore, income-based responsibility also accounts for emissions generated  
170 through international activities and can be used to minimize the effects of



171 carbon leakage.

172       Whereas the use of consumption-based responsibility as a metric to levy  
173 a carbon tax would be a tax on consumption, the equivalent use of income-  
174 based responsibility would function as an income tax. For example, such a  
175 tax would reduce more strongly the income earned by a worker of a coal fired  
176 power plant than the income earned by a farmer. The same logic applies to  
177 countries. The income generated by a country whose main activity is oil  
178 extraction would have a higher responsibility (and thus a higher tax rate)  
179 that the income of a country whose main activity is fruit production.

180       A recent report by IDE-Jetro and WTO (2011) draw attention to the  
181 drastic changes that occurred in the structure of international trade in the  
182 last decades. Many products are no longer made in a single country, but  
183 instead production chains have become fragmented, with different countries  
184 specializing in specific stages of the supply chain, leading to a move from  
185 trade in goods to a trade in tasks (Hummels et al., 2001; IDE-Jetro and WTO,  
186 2011). This shift increases the trade volume of intermediate goods, which  
187 are reexported several times during the processing stage, before reaching the  
188 country of assembly into a final good, which can itself be exported.

189       The emergence of global production chains changed the paradigm of in-  
190 ternational trade, from a situation in which the last step in a supply chain  
191 accounted for most added value to a situation in which it only represents a  
192 small fraction (IDE-Jetro and WTO, 2011). Under this current paradigm  
193 new statistical metrics, complementary to the traditional ones, new to be  
194 implemented in order to provide a clear view of the international trade. IDE-  
195 Jetro and WTO (2011) proposes the use of international trade through value

Responsibility	Production-based	Consumption-based	Income-based
Action	Production	Demand	Supply
Emissions	Direct	Embodied	Enabled
Direction	-	Upstream	Downstream

Table 1: Comparison between different types of approaches to GHG emissions responsibility.

196 added. This measure enables the correct determination of the relative im-  
 197 portance of each region that takes part in a global supply chain. This report  
 198 and the new framework it presents open the door for the wider application  
 199 of income-based responsibility.

#### 200 4. Case study

201 We quantified income-based responsibility for several world regions. In  
 202 this Section we show the results.

##### 203 4.1. Data and methodology

204 We used the Global Trade Analysis project database 7.1 (Narayanan and  
 205 Walmsley, 2008) to build a Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) model, for  
 206 the year 2004. The construction process of the model using GTAP data,  
 207 as well as the methodology to compute consumer-based responsibility are  
 208 described elsewhere (Rodrigues et al., submitted). We have computed the  
 209 income-based intensity iteratively using the following expression:

$$\mathbf{m}_{i+1}^D = \mathbf{m}_L + \hat{\mathbf{x}}^{-1} \mathbf{Z} \mathbf{m}_i^D, \quad (1)$$

210 where vectors are in column format,  $\hat{\cdot}$  is diagonal matrix,  $\mathbf{m}^L$  and  $\mathbf{m}^D$  are  
 211 the vectors of direct and downstream carbon intensity (Rodrigues et al., 2010)  
 212 and  $\mathbf{Z}$  and  $\mathbf{x}$  are, respectively, the matrix of inter-industry transactions and  
 213 the vector of total output. The initial condition is  $\mathbf{m}_0^D = \mathbf{m}^L$ , and converge  
 214 occurs when a desired fraction of downstream emissions embodied in primary  
 215 income has fell below a threshold of  $1 \times 10^{-6}\%$ .

216 *4.2. Per capita and per dollar GDP carbon responsibilities*

217 The detailed results obtained are reported in Table 2. In order to facili-  
 218 tate the subsequent discussion we selected 15 representative regions for which  
 219 we present figures. These regions comprise individual countries and two ag-  
 220 gregated EU regions: EUR-17 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark Finland,  
 221 Greece, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,  
 222 Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and EUR-10 (Czech Repub-  
 223 lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
 224 The latter is the group of countries that joined the European Union in 2004.

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
AUS	Australia	315.27	305.47	376.61	19.94	637.79
NZL	New Zealand	28.34	34.30	29.45	3.99	96.44
XOC	Rest of Oceania	17.22	17.75	15.56	8.71	21.28
CHN	China	4071.13	3147.11	3450.95	1307.99	1674.13
HKG	Hong Kong	54.70	97.23	92.20	6.96	163.01
JPN	Japan	924.98	1214.09	1058.83	127.92	4658.74
KOR	South Korea	344.35	335.40	316.03	47.64	676.50
TWN	Taiwan	220.70	167.41	199.11	22.76	305.29
XEA	Rest of East Asia	75.80	57.27	65.68	25.36	25.59
KHM	Cambodia	2.81	3.71	2.19	13.80	4.88
IDN	Indonesia	295.57	261.55	307.17	220.08	254.70
LAO	Lao PDR	1.40	2.00	1.11	5.79	2.45

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GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
MYS	Malasya	125.32	68.91	145.18	24.89	114.90
PHL	Philippines	67.38	72.68	52.22	81.62	84.48
SGP	Singapore	38.20	58.33	46.76	4.27	106.81
THA	Thainland	192.72	144.05	148.13	63.69	161.70
VNM	Vietname	72.93	67.97	55.31	83.12	43.03
XSE	Rest of Southeast Asia	7.44	9.08	18.02	51.30	5.59
BGD	Bangladesh	28.78	41.11	25.00	139.21	55.91
IND	India	919.76	860.79	760.23	1087.12	641.26
PAK	Pakistan	111.19	126.67	88.15	154.79	94.73
LKA	Sri Lanka	10.86	15.63	9.25	20.57	20.08
XSA	Rest of South Asia	8.35	13.97	7.77	56.32	13.90
CAN	Canada	460.01	424.99	512.81	31.96	979.13
USA	United States of America	4879.14	5511.71	4650.48	295.41	11673.38
MEX	Mexico	327.08	353.65	189.41	105.70	683.24
XNA	Rest of North America	3.15	4.95	1.49	0.13	5.89
ARG	Argentina	118.20	88.41	124.44	38.37	150.40
BOL	Bolivia	8.96	8.52	9.39	9.01	8.78
BRA	Brazil	234.81	215.53	241.66	183.91	616.54
CHL	Chile	54.98	44.07	52.67	16.12	89.64
COL	Colombia	45.19	48.14	62.14	44.92	97.46
ECU	Ecuador	17.31	21.09	26.82	13.04	29.97
PRY	Paraguay	2.87	4.55	4.79	6.02	8.42
PER	Peru	25.09	30.06	27.98	27.56	68.63
URY	Uruguay	4.02	6.30	3.39	3.44	13.69
VEN	Venezuela	123.52	88.30	179.07	26.28	108.23
XSM	Rest of South America	1.86	2.37	1.23	1.39	3.52
CRI	Costa Rica	4.14	6.39	5.11	4.25	19.47
GTM	Guatemala	8.47	13.49	6.47	12.29	27.45
NIC	Nicaragua	3.51	4.56	1.85	5.38	4.39
PAN	Panama	4.87	7.86	5.24	3.18	12.60
XCA	Rest of Central America	11.00	16.51	8.51	14.07	24.15
XCB	Caribbean	142.85	139.65	89.92	38.45	193.12
AUT	Austria	52.27	82.86	68.14	8.17	292.31
BEL	Belgium	72.39	124.15	85.20	10.42	352.31
CYP	Cyprus	7.05	9.24	5.45	0.83	15.42
CZE	Czech Republic	99.41	81.15	81.68	10.23	108.03
DNK	Denmark	44.27	62.00	65.20	5.41	243.73

Continued on next page

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
EST	Estonia	15.03	13.55	10.68	1.34	10.22
FIN	Finland	57.67	69.19	64.69	5.24	185.92
FRA	France	255.58	410.46	302.32	60.26	2046.47
DEU	Germany	599.25	804.45	733.92	82.65	2740.50
GRC	Greece	74.78	94.89	77.69	11.10	205.20
HUN	Hungary	42.71	52.20	37.33	10.12	99.65
IRL	Ireland	33.97	46.59	52.95	4.08	182.24
ITA	Italy	332.60	476.05	340.80	58.03	1677.82
LVA	Latvia	6.45	11.84	5.85	2.32	13.47
LTU	Lithuania	9.42	14.51	9.15	3.44	21.20
LUX	Luxembourg	9.73	11.25	9.83	0.45	31.86
MLT	Malta	2.73	3.43	1.56	0.40	5.32
NLD	Netherlands	165.81	172.01	155.14	16.23	578.98
POL	Poland	240.70	212.64	202.00	38.56	233.62
PRT	Portugal	50.19	64.34	45.92	10.44	167.72
SVK	Slovakia	24.67	25.91	20.51	5.40	41.55
SVN	Slovenia	12.62	13.93	12.97	1.97	32.52
ESP	Spain	266.76	324.69	258.40	42.65	1039.90
SWE	Sweden	37.41	69.97	64.65	9.01	346.41
GBR	United Kingdom	438.29	657.35	541.88	59.48	2123.60
CHE	Switzerland	26.69	72.40	59.52	7.24	357.54
NOR	Norway	52.45	46.51	143.27	4.60	250.05
XEF	Rest of EFTA	4.62	5.64	4.68	0.32	15.71
ALB	Albania	4.24	5.77	3.82	3.11	8.99
BGR	Bulgaria	41.83	31.29	32.12	7.78	24.57
BLR	Belarus	50.59	43.54	48.50	9.81	21.96
HRV	Croatia	15.20	20.30	11.58	4.54	33.93
ROU	Romania	76.53	69.01	58.11	21.79	74.42
RUS	Russian Federation	1332.95	1016.77	1464.48	143.90	569.84
UKR	Ukraine	217.62	126.61	159.47	46.99	60.98
XEE	Rest of Eastern Europe	5.89	8.15	3.05	4.22	2.60
XER	Rest of Europe	70.96	68.06	56.35	14.29	44.98
KAZ	Kazakhstan	161.61	134.85	157.05	14.84	44.35
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	5.18	5.71	4.66	5.20	2.21
XSU	Rest of former Soviet Union	132.88	94.27	128.90	37.40	20.20
ARM	Armenia	3.38	4.29	2.47	3.03	3.34
AZE	Azerbaijan	24.18	26.86	21.59	8.35	8.73

Continued on next page

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
GEO	Georgia	2.43	4.67	2.36	4.52	4.47
IRN	Iran	299.80	301.86	340.16	68.80	157.86
TUR	Turkey	163.34	192.71	153.30	72.22	295.83
XWS	Rest of West Asia	909.16	707.86	1235.51	118.40	691.10
EGY	Egypt	120.29	101.71	113.73	72.64	76.81
MAR	Morocco	31.86	38.01	27.92	31.02	50.25
TUN	Tunisia	18.38	18.61	14.76	10.00	27.99
XNF	Rest of Norh Africa	127.64	110.65	191.62	38.10	112.39
NGA	Nigeria	39.92	38.16	101.83	128.71	68.57
SEN	Senegal	4.15	5.91	2.24	11.39	7.20
XWF	Rest of West Africa	19.85	34.51	20.36	117.42	50.73
XCF	Rest of Central Africa	7.80	11.54	27.42	35.36	38.01
XAC	Rest of South C. Africa	9.09	14.40	37.72	71.34	23.89
ETH	Ethiopia	3.70	6.74	2.34	75.60	7.28
MDG	Madagascar	1.36	2.03	1.84	18.11	4.35
MWI	Malawi	0.55	1.57	0.63	12.61	1.79
MUS	Mauritius	1.83	3.80	2.43	1.23	5.92
MOZ	Mozambique	1.60	3.40	2.04	19.42	6.09
TZA	Tanzania	3.06	6.51	2.99	37.63	11.47
UGA	Uganda	2.26	3.51	2.90	27.82	7.27
ZMB	Zambia	1.77	3.09	2.14	11.48	5.40
ZWE	Zimbabwe	8.78	6.89	7.81	12.94	4.08
XEC	Rest of Eastern Africa	21.04	34.27	25.33	99.73	50.19
BWA	Botswana	3.76	6.38	4.53	1.77	8.72
ZAF	South Africa	329.12	213.38	312.64	47.21	213.93
XSC	Rest of SACU	3.44	6.33	4.86	4.84	9.06
		21731	21731	21731	6405	40962

Table 2: Producer, consumer and income-based responsibility of GTAP regions (year 2004) (Mt CO<sub>2</sub>).

225

226 Figure 1 displays the per capita producer, consumer and income-based  
227 responsibilities of selected countries. The per capita normalization allows a  
228 better comparison between countries than the corresponding absolute val-




Figure 1: Per capita producer, consumer and income-based responsibilities (in ton CO<sub>2</sub>).

229 ues. Per capita producer responsibility tells us how many tons of CO<sub>2</sub> are  
 230 generated inside the country's border per inhabitant. Per capita consumer  
 231 responsibility indicates how many emissions each person is responsible for as  
 232 a consumer of final goods and services. Finally, income responsibility are the  
 233 emissions enabled by each person as a supplier of primary inputs.

234 We see that citizens of wealthier economies are, on average, responsible  
 235 for more CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than citizens from least developed economies. We  
 236 also see that in wealthier regions per capita consumer responsibility is typ-  
 237 ically higher than producer responsibility. This observation indicates that,  
 238 in these regions, the (upstream) carbon embodied in exports exceed the car-

239 bon embodied in exports. This phenomenon is particularly striking in small  
240 open economies, such as Singapore (SGP) or Switzerland (CHE), why rely  
241 strongly on international trade.

242 However, some rich economies such as Canada (CAN), Australia (AUS)  
243 and Norway (NOR) are an exceptions to this norm. These countries have  
244 per capita consumer responsibilities lower than producer responsibilities but  
245 interestingly, all exhibit an income-based responsibility that is higher than  
246 producer responsibility. This same pattern can be observed in other coun-  
247 tries, for example Russia (RUS), South Africa (ZAF) or Venezuela (VEN).  
248 This indicates that the supply of primary inputs provided by these regions  
249 enabled the generation of emissions abroad.

250 A similarity between all countries mentioned in the previous paragraph is  
251 the fact that they are all fossil fuel exporters. Therefore, the interpretation  
252 of these results is straightforward. It is the export of fossil fuels that enables  
253 the occurrence of emissions abroad when the fuel is burned and the emis-  
254 sions take place. The rationale for income-based responsibility can be put  
255 as follows: a country who supplies fossil fuels should hold responsibility for  
256 the emissions generated downstream, because it receives money from the fuel  
257 sale. Interestingly, using this indicator we find that Norway, a country with  
258 mostly hydro-generated electricity and and a very ‘clean’ economy (Peters  
259 and Hertwich, 2006; Yamakawa and Peters, 2011), has the highest per-capita  
260 income-based responsibility in the world.

261 In Figure 2 producer, consumer and income-based GDP intensities are  
262 plotted. We find that developing economies have higher carbon intensities  
263 than more developed economies. The relations between producer, consumer






Figure 2: Per 2004 dollar GDP producer, consumer and income-based responsibilities (in ton CO<sub>2</sub>).

264 and income responsibilities are maintained, in case of rich countries the differ-  
 265 ences are smoothed (for example, NOR), in case of not so wealthier countries  
 266 differences are sharpened (for example, VEN).

## 267 5. Conclusions

268 The aim of this work is to clarify and illustrate the potential applications  
 269 of the concept of downstream responsibility. We believe that the modest  
 270 size of the literature and research on this topic results from the difficulty in  
 271 providing a clear intuition for this metric, which in turn makes the under-

272 standing by the general public difficult.

273       However, we believe that this lack of intuitiveness might be a problem  
274 of nomenclature. Will the general read recognize upstream responsibility  
275 as consumer-based responsibility? Probably not. Therefore we propose the  
276 term income-based responsibility to address downstream responsibility.

277       To provide some illustrations of this metric we present empirical values  
278 of income-based responsibility and compare them to the Kyoto definition of  
279 producer responsibility and the frequently used measure of consumer-based  
280 responsibility. We find that for some countries, each the responsibility metric  
281 provides very different values, while for other countries, they are all very  
282 similar.

283       The most emblematic case is that of Norway. This is a rich nation, seen as  
284 one of the 'cleanest' countries in the world, with low producer and consumer  
285 responsibilities. However, when it is analyzed from the point of view of the  
286 emissions enabled by its income we find that Norway is a country whose  
287 income is generated at the expense of large CO<sub>2</sub> emissions due to the export  
288 of fossil fuels.

289       If a consumer-based indicator is used, a costumer can improve his/her  
290 environmental performance through the selection of clean suppliers. An  
291 income-based indicator offers the symmetric possibility to suppliers. For  
292 example, Norway can increase its environmental performance by deciding to  
293 sell fossil fuels only to countries with carbon efficient production chains.

294       We hope that this paper has helped to clarify the interpretation and  
295 application scope of income-based responsibility .

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